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Note
REVISIONS OF THE THOMPSON MEMORANDUM AND AVOIDING THE
STEIN PROBLEMS: A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL POLICY ON THE
PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
BRENDAN J. KEEFE
Since 1999, the Department of Justice has periodically issued
memoranda instructing United States Attorneys on how to indict business
organizations. These memoranda became constitutionally questionable
after the Enron, WorldCom, and Adelphia scandals. Finally, a federal
district court declared part of one memorandum—known as the Thompson
Memorandum—in conjunction with the way the assistant U.S. attorney
presented the case against certain high-ranking employees of a business
organization, KPMG, LLP, to be in violation of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. This case is United States v. Stein.
This Note examines the district court case, the Second Circuit case that
affirmed the district court’s decision, and the subsequent memoranda
produced by the Department of Justice. This Note examines the
subsequent memoranda to determine whether the constitutional
deficiencies were remedied. This Note concludes that although the Stein
problems were resolved in the later memoranda, other potentially
constitutional problems exist.
These problems are identified and
discussed.
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REVISIONS OF THE THOMPSON MEMORANDUM AND AVOIDING THE
STEIN PROBLEMS: A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL POLICY ON THE
PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
BRENDAN J. KEEFE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has attempted to finalize its policy
on charging corporations criminally since 1999. In that year, then-Deputy
Attorney General Eric Holder1 released the first policy in a memorandum
entitled “Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations” (“Holder
Memorandum”).2 Over the years there have been many catalysts forcing
change to the policy. After the Enron and WorldCom scandals, the DOJ
made the policy more stern. This new policy was formulated by thenDeputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson in 2003. It was entitled
“Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations”
(“Thompson Memorandum”).3 For various reasons discussed in detail
below, the district court held in United States v. Stein that some aspects of
this new policy were unconstitutional.4 While appealing this decision, the
Government changed the policy to make it conform better to the court’s
holding.5 The third attempt is known as the “McNulty Memorandum.”6
*
Trinity College, B.A. 2007; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2010. I
would like to thank Professor Leonard Orland for his invaluable comments and guidance, without
which this Note would not have been possible. I would also like to thank the tireless staff of the
Connecticut Law Review for their hard work. This Note is dedicated to my parents, Hugh and Dorothy
Keefe, for their constant love and support. Any errors contained herein are mine and mine alone.
1
Eric Holder is now serving as President Obama’s Attorney General. See Neil A. Lewis, Holder
Is Confirmed as Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/03/us/
politics/03holder.html?hp (“The Senate voted overwhelmingly Monday evening to confirm Eric H.
Holder, Jr. to be the new attorney general of the United States.”).
2
Memorandum from Eric Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Component Heads and United
States Attorneys, on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/reports/1999/chargingcorps.html
[hereinafter
Holder
Memorandum].
3
Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Department
Components, United States Attorneys, on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations
(Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm [hereinafter
Thompson Memorandum].
4
United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
5
See James M. Keneally & Conor S. Harris, Revisions to the DOJ’s Guidelines on Corporate
Prosecutions, 23 ANDREWS LITIG. REP. 3, 4 (2008) (“Soon after Stein I was issued, the Thompson
Memorandum was replaced by the McNulty Memorandum, which was issued by then-Deputy Attorney
General Paul McNulty Dec. 12, 2006.”).
6
Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Department Components,
United States Attorneys, on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 12,
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On the same day that the Stein decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, the DOJ announced the latest revisions to its policy on
prosecuting business organizations.7 On August 28, 2008, then-Deputy
Attorney General Mark R. Filip announced these revisions which were not
in the form of a memorandum, but rather were made directly to the United
States Attorney’s Manual.8 This Note examines whether the DOJ has
cured the “Stein problems” with the Filip revisions.
In Stein, the Government attempted to prosecute sixteen employees9 of
the accounting firm KPMG, LLP (“KPMG”) for allegedly creating and
marketing fraudulent tax shelters.10 This has been called the “largest tax
fraud case in United States history.”11 Time Magazine summarized the
case in the following way: “[T]he accountants have taken a prosecutorial
beating. A Senate subcommittee publicly grilled them. The Justice
Department suggested they blab without their lawyers present. KPMG,
bending to government pressure, stopped covering its employees’ crushing
legal bills. And all this happened before any court ruled the tax shelters
improper.”12 In preparing for the trial of these defendants, the district court
held that the prosecution violated the defendants’ Fifth and Sixth
2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty
Memorandum].
7
See United States v. Stein (Stein V), 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Keneally & Harris,
supra note 5, at 4–5; Mark R. Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Deputy
Att’y Gen. Mark R. Filip at Press Conference Announcing Revisions to Corporate Changing
Guidelines (Aug. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Filip’s August 28 Press Conference].
8
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, ch. 9-28.00 (2008) [hereinafter U.S. Attorneys’
Manual], available at http:// www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm;
Filip’s August 28 Press Conference, supra note 7; see also Keneally & Harris, supra note 5, at 3.
9
I will do as the court did and include KPMG partners in the term “employees” for ease of
expression. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 341 n.36.
10
Id. at 330.
11
See id. at 362 (“This is by no means a garden-variety criminal case. It has been described as the
largest tax fraud case in United States history.”); see also Reuters, Defendants in KPMG Fraud Case
Get a Break, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2008, at C9.
12
Reynolds Holding, Accounting for Crime, TIME, Mar. 8, 2007, available at http://www.time.
com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1597468,00.html. With respect to the Senate subcommittee, the
Stein I court described a particularly heated moment at the hearing:
A few months later, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs “began an investigation into the development,
marketing and implementation of abusive tax shelters by accountants, lawyers,
financial advisors, and bankers.” This led to public hearings in November 2003 at
which several senior KPMG partners or former partners-three of them now
defendants here-testified.
The firm’s reception at the hearing was not favorable. Senator Coleman, the
subcommittee chair, for example, opened the hearing by saying that “the ethical
standards of the legal and accounting profession have been pushed, prodded, bent
and, in some cases, broken, for enormous monetary gain.” At another point, Senator
Levin, the ranking minority member, in obvious exasperation at a KPMG witness,
suggested that the witness “try an honest answer.”
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338–39.
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13

Amendment rights. This eventually led U.S. District Judge Lewis A.
Kaplan of the Southern District of New York to dismiss thirteen of the
indictments.14 This decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, but only on the Sixth Amendment grounds.15
The Government made two decisions with respect to whom to hold
accountable for the alleged fraud in this case. First, the Government
decided to enter into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (“DPA”) with the
corporation, KPMG.16 Second, the Government decided to indict and
prosecute the individual employees it suspected of the criminal
wrongdoing.17 As mentioned above, the prosecutors depended on the
Thompson Memorandum in deciding whether to indict corporations when
making these decisions.18 The Thompson Memorandum lists factors that
must be considered by the United States Attorney’s Office (“USAO”) in
determining whether to indict the corporation.19 Unlike the Holder
Memorandum, the Thompson Memorandum’s factors are mandatory.20 At
least one critic has said that the Thompson Memorandum has become
“shorthand for prosecutorial abuse.”21
The way a corporation can stave off indictment is by fully cooperating
with the Government.22 Indeed, the Thompson Memorandum states that
13

See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 330.
See United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“The
indictment therefore will be dismissed as to thirteen of the sixteen KPMG Defendants.”).
15
United States v. Stein (Stein V), 541 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008) (“In light of this disposition,
we do not reach the district court’s Fifth Amendment ruling.”).
16
See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 349 (“On August 29, 2005, KPMG and the government entered
into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (“DPA”). KPMG agreed, among other things, to waive
indictment, to be charged in a one-count information, to admit extensive wrongdoing, to pay a $456
million fine, and to accept restrictions on its practice. The government agreed that it will seek
dismissal of the information if KPMG complies with its obligations. In a nutshell, KPMG stands to
avoid a criminal conviction if it lives up to its part of the bargain.”).
17
See id. at 350 (“At about the same time [as the DPA was made], the government filed the initial
indictment in this case.”).
18
The Thompson Memorandum—unlike the Holder Memorandum—is mandatory. See, e.g., id.
at 338 (“Unlike its predecessor, however, the Thompson Memorandum is binding on all federal
prosecutors.”).
19
Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3 §§ II–VIII.
20
See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338 (“Unlike its predecessor, however, the Thompson
Memorandum is binding on all federal prosecutors.”); see also id. at n.12 (“The Thompson
Memorandum sets forth nine factors that federal prosecutors must consider in determining whether to
charge a corporation or other business organization.” (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Resource
Manual § 163 (2005))).
21
Peter Lattman, The Holder Memo and Its Progeny, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2006,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/12/13/the-holder-memo.
22
See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 364, (“As KPMG’s new chief legal officer, former U.S. District
Judge Sven Erik Holmes, testified, he thought it indispensable (as would any defense lawyer) ‘to be
able to say at the right time with the right audience, we’re in full compliance with the Thompson
Memorandum.’”); see also Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3 (“The main focus of the revisions is
increased emphasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation's cooperation.”).
14
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the main reason for revising the Holder Memorandum was to put an
“increased emphasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation's
The reason that the Thompson Memorandum is
cooperation.”23
controversial is because it forces prosecutors to look negatively on a
corporation if it pays for its employees’ legal fees, unless the corporation is
legally bound to pay them—either by state statute or contractual
agreement.24 In other words, if a corporation pays the legal fees of their
employees, the corporation is less likely to be deemed to have cooperated
with the Government. This means that a corporation that pays for their
employees’ legal fees is more likely to be indicted. This policy, the district
court noted, seems to be at odds with the constitutional rights of the
defendants—specifically, the Fifth Amendment right to Due Process and
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.25
Since the well-publicized indictment and subsequent collapse of
Arthur Andersen, the attorney for KPMG, Robert S. Bennett, of Skadden
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (“Skadden”) knew that an indictment
could effectively kill KPMG. After Arthur Andersen, it became clear that
a corporation could collapse from an indictment alone, without a
conviction or even a trial.26 Skadden was hired to “save” the corporation,
not to “protect the individuals.”27 Mr. Bennett made this explicitly clear at
the first meeting between Skadden and the USAO.28 Mr. Bennett also
23

Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3.
See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338 (“Unlike its predecessor, however, the Thompson
Memorandum is binding on all federal prosecutors.”); see also id. at 344 (“[It] was understood by both
KPMG and government representatives as a reminder that payment of legal fees by KPMG, beyond
any that it might legally be obligated to pay, could well count against KPMG in the government’s
decision whether to indict the firm.”); Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3, at § VI.
25
See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 356 (“The Government Violated the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments by Causing KPMG to Cut Off Payment of Legal Fees and Other Defense Costs Upon
Indictment.”).
26
See id. at 382 n.243 (“The indictment of Arthur Andersen LLP resulted in the effective demise
of that large accounting firm, and the loss of many thousands of jobs of innocent employees, long
before the case ever went to trial.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 337 n.11 (“[N]o major financial
services firm has ever survived a criminal indictment.”); United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F. Supp.
2d 390, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (referring to prosecutors’ indictment power as their “life or death”
power); Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in Deferred
Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 165–66 (2008) (“The company’s indictment
‘effectively put the eighty-nine-year-old firm out of business and forced tens of thousands of people to
find new jobs. It also had a dramatic effect on the accounting industry, by turning the ‘big 5’ into the
‘big 4.’”).
27
See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 341 (“[In a meeting with prosecutors] Mr. Bennett explained that
Skadden had been hired in view of Mr. O’Kelly’s concern about the controversy with the IRS and the
Senate hearings and that KPMG had decided to clean house and change the atmosphere at the firm. He
reported that the firm had taken high-level personnel action already, that it would cooperate fully with
the government’s investigation, and that the object was to save KPMG, not to protect any
individuals.”).
28
Id. at 340.
24
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referenced Arthur Andersen at this first meeting; the court summarizes his
remarks as follows: “In an obvious reference to the fate of Arthur
Andersen, he said that an indictment of KPMG would result in the firm
going out of business.”29 With the demise of Arthur Andersen looming
overhead, it was clear to Skadden that anything short of full cooperation
with the Government would risk indictment.30
Because a simple indictment could be fatal to a corporation, the
Government has the upper hand from the very beginning of the criminal
justice process. This makes it very easy for the USAO to enforce the
Thompson Memorandum and its cooperation policy. It also puts the
Government in a paternalistic position. A corporation facing indictment
will offer to do a lot of things it ordinarily would not do.31 The
Government has the responsibility to control the zealousness of the all-toowilling-to-please corporation to ensure that no one’s constitutional rights
are being violated.32 The district court here held that instead of looking out
for the defendants’ constitutional rights, the Government encouraged
KPMG to limit their defense whenever possible, thus violating the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments.33
The history of the KPMG case can be somewhat confusing. Before the
Government appealed the case to the Second Circuit, there were four
separate rulings. For the convenience of the reader, the succinct summary
of those rulings which was laid out by the Second Circuit is reproduced
here:
The United States appeals from an order of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York
(Kaplan, J.), dismissing an indictment against thirteen former
partners and employees of the accounting firm KPMG, LLP
. . . (“Stein I”). . . .
In later decisions, Judge Kaplan ruled that defendants
Richard Smith and Mark Watson’s proffer session statements
29

Id. at 341.
See id. (“He reported that the firm had taken high-level personnel action already, that it would
cooperate fully with the government’s investigation, and that the object was to save KPMG.” (emphasis
added)).
31
Id. at 352.
32
See, e.g., id. at 353 (“KPMG was extremely anxious to curry favor with the USAO by
demonstrating how cooperative it could be, and . . . KPMG had an obvious conflict of interest with its
present and former personnel on the question whether it had a legal obligation to pay fees. Had the
government been less concerned with punishing those it deemed culpable right from the outset, it
would not have accepted KPMG’s word on this point.”); see also id. at 381 (“As a unanimous Supreme
Court wrote long ago, the interest of the government ‘in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done.’” (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935))).
33
See id. at 353 (“[T]he government conducted itself in a manner that evidenced a desire to
minimize the involvement of defense attorneys.”).
30
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were obtained in violation of their Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, and that their statements
would be suppressed . . . (“Stein II”); that the court had
ancillary jurisdiction over Defendants-Appellees’ civil suit
against KPMG for advancement of fees[] . . . (“Stein III”),
vacated, Stein v. KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d 753 (2d Cir. 2007);
and that dismissal of the indictment is the appropriate remedy
for those constitutional violations . . . (“Stein IV”).34
In examining the courts’ opinions and the various policies of the DOJ
on prosecuting corporations, it is important to keep in mind two,
sometimes conflicting, principles of American jurisprudence. The first
principle is that the United States distinguishes itself from other countries
by not allowing corporations to get away with criminal wrongdoing. This
principle is better stated by the journalist Thomas Friedman:
What makes capital provision work so well in America is the
security and regulation of our capital markets, where
minority shareholders are protected. Lord knows, there are
scams, excesses, and corruption in our capital markets. That
always happens when a lot of money is at stake. What
distinguishes our capital markets is not that Enrons don’t
happen in America—they sure do. It is that when they
happen, they usually get exposed, either by the Securities and
Exchange Commission or by the business press, and get
corrected. What makes America unique is not Enron but
Eliot Spitzer, the attorney general of New York State, who
has doggedly sought to clean up the securities industry and
corporate boardrooms.35
The second principle is that a criminal prosecutor’s interest is not in a
conviction, but rather in the administration of justice. As Justice
Sutherland wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court in Berger v. United
States:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He
34
35

United States v. Stein (Stein V), 541 F.3d 130, 135 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2008).
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT 332 (2007).
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may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should
do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.36
Judge Kaplan concluded his opinion by saying that justice was not done in
Stein:
Justice is not done when the government uses the threat of
indictment—a matter of life and death to many companies
and therefore a matter that threatens the jobs and security of
blameless employees—to coerce companies into depriving
their present and even former employees of the means of
defending themselves against criminal charges in a court of
law. If those whom the government suspects are culpable in
fact are guilty, they should pay the price.
But the
determination of guilt or innocence must be made fairly—not
in a proceeding in which the government has obtained an
unfair advantage long before the trial even has begun.37
Part II of this Note examines the pertinent facts of Stein I. Part III
discusses the district court’s reasoning behind ultimately finding that the
KPMG defendants’ Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated.
Part IV examines the reasoning behind the Second Circuit’s holding that
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the indictments, and identifies the
relatively small piece of the district court’s ruling that was actually
affirmed. Part V examines the changes to the Thompson Memorandum
and the DOJ policy on criminally charging corporations after the Stein I
decision. It also discusses the ways federal prosecutors can avoid a Stein
decision in the future.

36

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). Judge Kaplan cited to Justice Sutherland’s
description in Stein I. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 381. See also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963) (“Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our
system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly. An inscription on
the walls of the Department of Justice states the proposition candidly under the federal domain: ‘The
United States wins a point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.’”). But see Kevin C.
McMunigal, Are Prosecutorial Ethics Standards Different?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1453–55
(2000) (“Berger neither defines nor applies an extraordinary prosecutorial duty. Rather, it enforces an
obligation that is quite ordinary in the sense that it applies equally to prosecutors, criminal defense
lawyers, and civil advocates—the obligation of lawyers in a trial not to assert their personal knowledge
of facts in issue.”).
37
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 381–82.
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II. FACTS OF STEIN I
What follows is a brief overview of the facts. Where there were any
ambiguities or questions of fact, the court acted as the fact finder and made
the ultimate conclusion.38
A. KPMG’s Policy on Paying Legal Fees
The defendants in Stein I were partners or employees of the accounting
firm KPMG, one of the largest accounting firms in the world.39 KPMG
had a longstanding policy of paying for its employees’ attorneys’ fees,
regardless of cost or whether the employees were charged with crimes.40
The court noted that KPMG has gone to “remarkable” lengths in paying
the legal fees of its employees.41 The court stated that KPMG paid over
$20 million “to defend four partners in a criminal investigation and related
civil litigation brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission.”42
The parties stipulated that KPMG’s longstanding policy was to advance the
legal fees without a preset cap or condition of cooperation with the
Government.43 Furthermore, another stipulation stated:
With the exception of the instant matter, KPMG is not aware
of any current or former partner, principal or employee who
has been indicted for conduct arising within the scope of the
individual's duties and responsibilities as a KPMG partner,
principal, or employee since [two partners] were indicted and
convicted of violation of federal criminal law in 1974.
Although KPMG has located no documents regarding
payment of legal fees in that case, KPMG believes that it did
pay pre- and post-indictment legal fees for the individuals in
that case.44
In other words, this was the first case in which KPMG did not pay its
employees’ legal costs without regard to cost and without being
conditioned on cooperation with the Government.
38

Id. at 352.
Id. at 336.
40
See id. (“KPMG long has paid for the legal defense of its personnel, regardless of the cost and
regardless of whether its personnel were charged with crimes.”).
41
See id. at 340 (“Moreover, the extent to which KPMG has gone is quite remarkable.”).
42
Id.
43
See id. (“[I]t had been the longstanding voluntary practice of KPMG to advance and pay legal
fees, without a preset cap or condition of cooperation with the government, for counsel for partners,
principals, and employees of the firm in those situations where separate counsel was appropriate to
represent the individual in any civil, criminal or regulatory proceeding involving activities arising
within the scope of the individual’s duties and responsibilities as a KPMG partner, principal, or
employee.”).
44
Id.
39
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B. DOJ Policy on Criminally Charging Corporations
As mentioned above, the first DOJ policy on the subject of indicting
corporations was the Holder Memorandum in 1999.45 This was written
just before the corporate fraud scandals that occurred in the early 2000s.
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act46 and
President Bush established the Corporate Fraud Task Force in 2002.47 In
the post-Enron, post-WorldCom era, and after the indictment and
subsequent collapse of Arthur Andersen,48 the DOJ put forth new and
tougher guidelines called “Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations” (“Thompson Memorandum”) by then-Deputy Attorney
General Larry D. Thompson in 2003.49 It is this edition of the DOJ’s
policy on prosecuting corporations that has upset many legal groups50 and
commentators51 and inspired subsequent legislation.52
The Thompson Memorandum is similar to its predecessor the Holder
Memorandum. It is identical to it in the area concerning cooperation and
advancing legal fees by business entities.53 Both the Holder and

45
Spivack & Raman, supra note 26, at 164. Each revision to the memoranda takes the name of
the Deputy Attorney General who authored it. See Holder Memorandum, supra note 2.
46
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
47
Spivack & Raman, supra note 26, at 164–65.
48
See id. at 165–66 (“The company’s indictment ‘effectively put the eighty-nine-year-old firm
out of business and forced tens of thousands of people to find new jobs. It also had a dramatic effect on
the accounting industry, by turning the ‘Big 5’ into the ‘Big 4.’”).
49
Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3.
50
These groups include, among others, the Association of Corporate Counsels, the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the United States Chamber of Commerce, the Business
Roundtable, the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Civil Liberties Union and the
American Bar Association. See, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, REPORT OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: EROSION AND YET, PROGRESS
(2007), available at http://www.acc.com/public/reference/acpriv/adcom2006privilegeassessmt.pdf
(summarizing the work that the ACC accomplished in confronting the federal policy from Oct. 2005 to
Jan. 2007); see also Letter from Michael S. Greco, American Bar Association, to Alberto Gonzales,
Attorney General, Department of Justice (May 2, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/
letters/attyclient/060502letter_acprivgonz.pdf (suggesting revisions to the DOJ policy on waiving the
attorney-client privilege); Lynnley Browning, U.S. Tactic on KPMG Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
2006, at C1; Corporate Lawyers Launch Attack on “Culture of Waiver,” CORP. CRIME REP., Mar. 6,
2006, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/whitecollar/WCnews025.
51
See, e.g., Lattman, supra note 21; Holding, supra note 12.
52
See Keneally & Harris, supra note 5, at 5 (“Despite its attempt to alleviate some of the
Thompson Memorandum’s perceived wrongs, the McNulty Memorandum failed to end criticism of the
Department of Justice’s policy. Congress is considering passage of legislation. . . . The House of
Representatives already passed H.R. 3013, the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, and
the Senate Judiciary Committee is currently considering its counterpart, S. 3217, the Attorney-Client
Protection Act of 2008.”).
53
See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“On January 20, 2003, Mr. Thompson
issued a document entitled Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (the
‘Thompson Memorandum’) which, in many respects, was a modest revision of the Holder
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Thompson Memoranda read, in pertinent part, as follows:
VI. Charging a Corporation: Cooperation and Voluntary
Disclosure
A. General Principle: In determining whether to charge a
corporation, that corporation’s timely and voluntary
disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate
with the government’s investigation may be relevant factors.
In gauging the extent of the corporation’s cooperation, the
prosecutor may consider the corporation’s willingness to
identify the culprits within the corporation, including senior
executives; to make witnesses available; to disclose the
complete results of its internal investigation; and to waive
attorney-client and work product protection.
...
Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is
whether the corporation appears to be protecting its culpable
employees and agents. Thus, while cases will differ
depending on the circumstances, a corporation’s promise of
support to culpable employees and agents, either through the
advancing of attorneys fees,54 through retaining the
employees without sanction for their misconduct, or through
providing information to the employees about the
government’s investigation pursuant to a joint defense
agreement, may be considered by the prosecutor in weighing
the extent and value of a corporation’s cooperation. By the
same token, the prosecutor should be wary of attempts to
shield corporate officers and employees from liability by a
willingness of the corporation to plead guilty.55
Clearly, both policies put a great emphasis on cooperation with the
Government. The Thompson Memorandum, however, went further in this
respect than did the Holder Memorandum. The Thompson Memorandum
added the following paragraph, emphasizing what it would consider
“impeding” behavior:

Memorandum. Indeed, the language concerning cooperation and advancing of legal fees by business
entities was carried forward without change.”).
54
See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3, at n.4; see also Holder Memorandum, supra note
2, at n.3 (“Some states require corporations to pay the legal fees of officers under investigation prior to
a formal determination of their guilt. Obviously, a corporation's compliance with governing law should
not be considered a failure to cooperate.”).
55
Holder Memorandum, supra note 2, § VI; Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3, § VI
(emphasis added).
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Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is
whether the corporation, while purporting to cooperate, has
engaged in conduct that impedes the investigation (whether
or not rising to the level of criminal obstruction). Examples
of such conduct include: overly broad assertions of corporate
representation of employees or former employees;
inappropriate directions to employees or their counsel, such
as directions not to cooperate openly and fully with the
investigation including, for example, the direction to decline
to be interviewed; making presentations or submissions that
contain misleading assertions or omissions; incomplete or
delayed production of records; and failure to promptly
disclose illegal conduct known to the corporation.56
Still, the most important difference between the two memoranda is that the
Thompson Memorandum is binding on all federal prosecutors.57 The
Stein I court noted, “all United States Attorneys now are obliged to
consider the advancing of legal fees by business entities, except such
advances as are required by law, as at least possibly indicative of an
attempt to protect culpable employees and as a factor weighing in favor of
indictment of the entity.”58
C. Communication Between KPMG and USAO Determined to be Coercive
Before examining these facts, it should be noted here that the actions
of the federal prosecutors together with the underlying threat to
uncooperative corporations inherent in the Thompson Memorandum were
deemed to be “coercive” and thus violative of the defendants’
constitutional rights.59 After becoming aware that KPMG could possibly
be indicted—and believing that indictment could very well mean the end
of the firm—the chairman of KPMG hired Skadden attorney Robert S.
Bennett to save the company.60 It was determined that the way to save
KPMG was for the company to “cooperate” as best as it could with the

56

Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3, § VI; see also Keneally & Harris, supra note 5, at 4.
See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338 (“Unlike its predecessor, however, the Thompson
Memorandum is binding on all federal prosecutors.”).
58
Id.
59
See id. at 352 (“As a direct result of the threat to the firm inherent in the Thompson
Memorandum . . . .”); see also id. at 373 (“Hence, if the government’s pressure on KPMG ultimately
resulted in improperly coerced statements, the matter may be fully redressed by suppression of the
statements.”); id. at 360 (“The Right to Fairness in the Criminal Process Is a Fundamental Liberty
Interest Entitled to Substantive Due Process Protection Where, As Here, the Government Coerces a
Third Party to Withhold Funds Lawfully Available to a Criminal Defendant.”).
60
Id. at 339.
57
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Government. KPMG’s “cooperative approach” involved many aspects.
The first aspect was to dissociate and sever ties with those who the
Government may deem “culpable.”62 KPMG decided to “ask Jeffrey Stein,
Richard Smith, and Jeffrey Eischeid, all senior KPMG partners who had
testified before the Senate and all now defendants here—to leave their
positions as deputy chair and chief operating officer of the firm, vice chairtax services, and a partner in personal financial planning, respectively.”63
It seemed “cleaning house” was not enough, as the IRS made a criminal
referral to the DOJ, which forwarded the referral to the USAO for the
Southern District of New York.64 The USAO notified KPMG of the
criminal referral, and they scheduled the first meeting.65
At this first meeting, Skadden told the USAO that it planned to
“cooperate fully” with the Government’s investigation.66 Skadden went
even further, saying “the object was to save KPMG, not to protect any
individuals.”67 Then the USAO turned to the subject of legal fees and
inquired whether KPMG was obligated to “pay the fees and what their
plans were.”68 Skadden asked for the Government’s view on the payment
of legal fees.69 The USAO answered by pointing to the Thompson
Memorandum.70 Skadden replied by saying that its common practice was
to pay the legal fees, but the partnership agreements were vague and
Delaware law gave the company the right to do whatever it wished.71
61
See id. (“[The chairman] retained . . . Robert S. Bennett[] ‘to come up with a new cooperative
approach.’”).
62
See id. (“One aspect of that new approach was a decision to ‘clean house’ . . . .”).
63
See id. (“Given Mr. Stein’s senior position and his relationship with Mr. O’Kelly, his departure
was cushioned substantially, although many of the facts have come to light only recently. He ‘retired’
from the firm with a $100,000 per month, three-year consulting agreement. He agreed to release the
firm and all of its partners, principals, and employees from all claims. He and KPMG agreed also that
Mr. Stein would be represented, at KPMG’s expense, in any suits brought against KPMG or its
personnel and himself, by counsel acceptable to both him and the firm or, if joint representation were
inappropriate or if Mr. Stein were the only party to a proceeding, by counsel reasonably acceptable to
Mr. Stein.”).
64
See id. (“In the early part of 2004, the IRS made a criminal referral to the Department of Justice
. . . which in turn passed it on to the United States Attorney’s Office for this district.”).
65
See id. at 340–41 (“The USAO notified Skadden of the referral, and a meeting was scheduled
for February 25, 2004.”).
66
See id. at 341 (“He reported that the firm had taken high-level personnel action already, that it
would cooperate fully with the government’s investigation . . . .”).
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
See id. (“Ms. Neiman said that the government would take into account KPMG’s legal
obligations, if any, to advance legal expenses, but referred specifically to the Thompson Memorandum
as a point that had to be considered.”).
71
See id. at 342 (“Messrs. Bennett and Bialkin told the USAO that KPMG’s ‘common practice’
had been to pay legal fees. They added that the partnership agreement was vague and that Delaware
law gave the company the right to do whatever it wished, but said that KPMG still was checking on its
legal obligations.”).
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Skadden then said that as long as it had the discretion to do so, it would not
pay the legal fees for employees who declined to cooperate with the
Government or who took the Fifth Amendment.72 On the subject of
KPMG’s discretion to pay the legal fees, the USAO said that misconduct
should not or could not be rewarded and referred to the federal
guidelines.73 This comment was understood by both KPMG and the
Government as a reminder of what is laid out in the Thompson
Memorandum—if KPMG paid the legal fees, beyond what it was legally
obligated to pay, it could be held against the accounting firm in the
Government’s decision of whether to indict.74 The statement made
immediately after, also by the USAO, supported this finding: “[I]f u [sic]
have discretion re fees—we’ll look at that under a microscope.”75 The
Court concluded that, although “the USAO did not say in so many words
that it did not want KPMG to pay legal fees, no one at the meeting could
have failed to draw that conclusion.”76
Mr. Bennett told the Government that it would present a “big problem”
if KPMG did not advance any legal fees because the firm was a
partnership.77 To solve this problem, Mr. Bennett said KPMG would put a
limit on the fees ($400,000) and condition the payment of the fees on the
individual employee “cooperating fully with the company and the
Government.”78 KPMG would deem an employee “uncooperative” and
thus stop payment on the legal fees if they invoked their Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.79 On a conference call between
Skadden and the USAO, Skadden lawyers made it clear that they would be
“as cooperative as possible” in order to keep the Government from

72

Id.
Id. There is some dispute over what the USAO meant by “federal guidelines”; however, the
court found that the intent of the comment was immaterial because it was how the comment was
understood that really mattered. See id. at 342–43 (“But the Court finds it unnecessary to decide [an
AUSA’s] subjective purpose in making the remark because what is more important is how her
comment was understood.”).
74
See id. at 344 (“In sum, [an AUSA’s] comment that ‘misconduct’ cannot or should not ‘be
rewarded’ under ‘federal guidelines,’ whatever went through her mind when she said it, was
understood by both KPMG and government representatives as a reminder that payment of legal fees by
KPMG, beyond any that it might legally be obligated to pay, could well count against KPMG in the
government's decision whether to indict the firm.”).
75
Id. (citing the handwritten notes of Mr. Pilchen, an attorney for KPMG).
76
Id.
77
See id. at 344–45 (“[Mr. Bennett] reported that KPMG did not think it had any binding legal
obligation to pay legal fees, but that ‘it would be a big problem’ not to do so because the firm was a
partnership.”)
78
Id. at 345.
79
See id. (“KPMG would pay his fees so long as Ms. Warley [an employee] cooperated with the
government. For example, he said, no fees would be paid if Ms. Warley invoked her privilege against
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.”).
73
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indicting the firm.
In response, the USAO urged KPMG to tell its
employees to be “totally open” with the USAO, “even if that meant
admitting criminal wrongdoing.”81 Skadden sent a form letter to all
employees who “appeared to be under suspicion” by the Government.82
This letter told them that their legal fees would be capped at $400,000;
conditioned on their cooperation with the Government and being “prompt,
complete, and truthful,” and that the payment of legal fees would cease
immediately if the employee is charged by the Government with criminal
wrongdoing.83 This was not enough for the USAO, however, and the
Government demanded that KPMG send out a supplemental letter.84 The
Government wanted KPMG to emphasize to their employees that they
could meet with an investigator without the assistance of counsel.85 The
court found that the purpose of demanding this supplement was to
“increase the chances that KPMG employees would agree to interviews
without consulting or being represented by counsel, whether provided by
KPMG or otherwise.”86
When the Government began investigating and interviewing individual
employees, Skadden asked to be notified whenever an employee failed to
cooperate.87 The Government notified Skadden many times about
employees’ failure to cooperate.88 Skadden would remind the employee
that their legal fees would be terminated if they refused to cooperate.89 In
some cases, this would be enough for the employee to decide to cooperate.
In others, they would continue to refuse whereupon they were fired and
their legal fees were no longer paid.90

80
See id. (“Mr. Bennett assured the USAO that KPMG would be ‘as cooperative as possible’ so
that the office would not exercise its discretion to indict the firm.”).
81
See id. (“[The USAO] urged that KPMG tell its people that they should be ‘totally open’ with
the USAO, ‘even if that [meant admitting] criminal wrongdoing.’”).
82
See id. (“[A] form letter that Skadden was sending to counsel for the KPMG Defendants then
employed by KPMG who had received subject letters from the government or otherwise appeared to be
under suspicion.”).
83
Id. at 345–46.
84
Id. at 346.
85
See id. at 347 (“No one suggests that either the original KPMG advice or the government’s
subsequent proposal misstated the law. The difference was one of emphasis.” (emphasis added)). The
USAO proposed the following language (Government’s proposed language is italicized): “Employees
are not required to use this counsel, or any counsel at all. Rather, employees are free to obtain their
own counsel, or to meet with investigators without the assistance of counsel. It is entirely your
choice.” Id. at 346.
86
Id. at 347.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
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D. The Deferred Prosecution Agreement
Federal prosecutors—perhaps recognizing that indicting major
corporations is not in the best interest of the public91—have increased the
use of DPAs.92 DPAs are a form of pretrial diversion where the
Government agrees to suspend charges against a corporation if the
corporation agrees to cooperate by making certain changes.93 The
corporation can avoid the severe collateral consequences of indictment by
entering a probationary period during which it will agree to do two things:
(1) the corporation will enact substantial internal reforms and (2) cooperate
with the Government, effectively helping prosecutors build a case against
individual employees.94 These obligations are generally set forth in a
detailed “contract.”95 This contract usually states that the Government will
agree not to pursue the criminal charges—that are typically filed
simultaneously with the DPA96—and to dismiss them after a period of
time—generally between one and two years—if the corporation agrees to
honor all the terms of the agreement.97 These agreements are recognized
as a compromise between the only two other options: a declination of
prosecution and a guilty plea.98
KPMG and the USAO entered into a DPA.99 KPMG agreed, among
other things, to waive indictment, be charged in a one-count information,
admit extensive wrongdoing, pay a $456 million fine, and accept
91
See Tom Bawden, KPMG Warned of ‘Death Spiral’ in Tax Shelter Fraud Case, TIMES, June
20, 2007, available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_
finance/article1957547.ece (“KPMG. . . told the US Justice Department that it would unleash a ‘nuclear
bomb’ that would leave more than 1,000 companies without an auditor, if it indicted the firm. . . .
KPMG employed 20,000 people ‘whose lives will be destroyed,’ he said. . . . ‘We’re asking you to use
a smart bomb, not a nuclear bomb.’ [The USAO] referred to Mr. Bennett’s argument as ‘ridiculous,’
according to the documents, although it seemed to work. Two senior US Justice Department officials
intervened and KPMG avoided an indictment.”).
92
See Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 321 (2007) (“Their popularity with prosecutors has increased since the public
opprobrium that followed the Arthur Andersen case . . . .”); see also Spivack & Raman, supra note 26,
at 159 (“In the four years between 2002 and 2005, prosecutors and major corporations entered into
twice as many of these agreements . . . as in the previous ten years combined.”). But see Marcia Coyle,
Deferred, Nonprosecution Deals Fall By 60%, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 9, 2009, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202428013402 (“The number of deferred and
nonprosecution agreements between the U.S. Department of Justice and corporations declined by 60%
in 2008—from a historic high of 40 in 2007 to 16 last year, according to a forthcoming study.”).
93
Griffin, supra note 92, at 321.
94
Spivack & Raman, supra note 26, at 160.
95
Griffin, supra note 92, at 321.
96
See id. at 322 (“Entry into a DPA ordinarily will coincide with the filing of formal criminal
charges against a company, the suspension of Speedy Trial Act considerations, and the tolling of the
statute of limitations.”).
97
Id. at 322.
98
Id. at 321.
99
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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restrictions on its practice.
The Government agreed that it would seek
dismissal of the information if KPMG complies with its obligations.101
KPMG could avoid a criminal conviction if it lived up to its part of the
bargain. The DPA also obliged KPMG to continue to cooperate
extensively with the Government, both in general and in the Government's
prosecution of this indictment. It provides in pertinent part:
7. KPMG acknowledges and understands that its cooperation
with the criminal investigation by the Office [USAO] is an
important and material factor underlying the Office’s
decision to enter into this Agreement, and, therefore, KPMG
agrees to cooperate fully and actively with the [government].
8. KPMG agrees that its continuing cooperation with the
Office's investigation shall include, but not be limited to, the
following:
(a) Completely and truthfully disclosing all information in its
possession to the [government], including but not limited to
all information about activities of KPMG, present and former
partners, employees, and agents of KPMG;
...
(e) Not asserting, in relation to the Office, any claim of
privilege (including but not limited to the attorney-client
privilege and the work product protection) as to any
documents, records, information, or testimony requested by
the Office related to its investigation . . .
...
9. KPMG agrees that its obligations to cooperate will
continue even after the dismissal of the Information, and
KPMG will continue to fulfill the cooperation obligations set
forth in this Agreement in connection with any investigation,
criminal prosecution or civil proceeding brought by the
Office or by or against the IRS or the United States relating
to or arising out of the conduct set forth in the Information
and the Statement of Facts and relating in any way to the
Office’s investigation.102
In short, anything the Government regards as a failure to cooperate could
result in the prosecution of the information.103 If the Government decides
100

Id.
Id.
102
Id. at 349–50.
103
Id. at 350.
101
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to prosecute, they will almost certainly get a conviction because of the
“extensive admissions of wrongdoing” KPMG made as part of the DPA.
E. The Court Makes Four Factual Conclusions
The court held an evidentiary hearing to determine “whether the
Government, through the Thompson Memorandum or otherwise, affected
KPMG’s determination(s) with respect to the advancement of legal fees
and other defense costs to present or former partners and employees with
respect to the investigation and prosecution of this case and such
subsidiary issues as relate thereto.”104 This hearing led the court to make
four factual conclusions. The first factual conclusion was that the
Thompson Memorandum alone caused KPMG to decide not to pay the
legal fees of its employees.105 Second, the actions of the USAO reinforced
the threat inherent in the Thompson Memorandum, specifically that the
paying of the legal fees could be held against the firm.106 Third, the
Government acted in a manner that suggested that it wanted to minimize
the involvement of defense attorneys and wherever possible, to interview
KPMG employees without a lawyer present.107 Fourth, “KPMG’s decision
to cut off all payments of legal fees and expenses to anyone who was
indicted and to limit and to condition such payments prior to indictment
upon cooperation with the Government was the direct consequence of the
pressure applied by the Thompson Memorandum and the USAO.”108

104

Id. at 352.
See id. (“First, the Thompson Memorandum caused KPMG to consider departing from its
long-standing policy of paying legal fees and expenses of its personnel in all cases and investigations
even before it first met with the USAO. As a direct result of the threat to the firm inherent in the
Thompson Memorandum, it sought an indication from the USAO that payment of fees in accordance
with its settled practice would not be held against it.”).
106
See id. at 352–53 (“Second, . . . [the USAO] deliberately, and consistent with DOJ policy,
reinforced the threat inherent in the Thompson Memorandum. It placed the issue of payment of legal
fees high on its agenda for its first meeting with KPMG counsel, which emphasized the prosecutors'
concern with the issue. [The USAO] raised the issue and then repeatedly focused on KPMG’s
‘obligations,’ thus clearly implying—consistent with the language of the Thompson Memorandum—
that compliance with legal obligations would be countenanced, but that anything more than compliance
with demonstrable legal obligations could be held against the firm.”).
107
See id. at 353 (“Third, the government conducted itself in a manner that evidenced a desire to
minimize the involvement of defense attorneys. This objective arguably is inherent, to some degree, in
the Thompson Memorandum itself. But there is considerably more proof, specific to this case, here.
The contretemps with KPMG over its Advisory Memorandum demonstrated the government’s desire,
wherever possible, to interview KPMG witnesses without their being represented by lawyers. . . . Had
the government been less concerned with punishing those it deemed culpable right from the outset, it
would not have accepted KPMG’s word on this point.”).
108
See id. (“Absent the Thompson Memorandum and the actions of the USAO, KPMG would
have paid the legal fees and expenses of all of its partners and employees both prior to and after
indictment, without regard to cost.”).
105
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III. DISTRICT COURT HELD THAT THE DEFENDANTS’
FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED
A. Summary of the District Court’s Due Process Analysis
The district court’s ruling can be summarized by a syllogism. First, a
criminal defendant has a fundamental right to obtain and use resources
lawfully available to him or her in order to prepare a defense, free of
knowing or reckless government interference.109 This fundamental right is
rooted in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.110 Second, the defendants in this case had such resources
available to them.111 Third, but for the knowing or reckless government
interference, the resources would not have been capped at $400,000 and
conditioned upon full cooperation with the Government.112 Therefore,
because the resources to prepare a defense were capped and conditioned,
the defendants’ rights were violated.113 This section looks at each premise
and the conclusion in turn.
B.

First Premise: The Fundamental Right to Use Resources Without
Government Infringement

The Stein I court concluded that a criminal defendant has a
fundamental right to obtain and use resources lawfully available to him or
109
See id. at 361–62 (“[T]his Court concludes that such a right is basic to our concepts of justice
and fair play. It is fundamental.”).
110
See id. at 357, nn.121–22 and accompanying text (“The Supreme Court long has protected a
defendant’s right to fairness in the criminal process. It has grounded this protection primarily in the
Due Process Clause as well as more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, including the
Confrontation and Assistance of Counsel Clauses of the Sixth Amendment. Whatever the textual
source, however, the Court consistently has held that criminal defendants are entitled to be treated
fairly throughout the process. In everyday language, they are entitled to a fair shake.” (internal
citations omitted)).
111
See id. at 336 (“KPMG long has paid for the legal defense of its personnel, regardless of the
cost and regardless of whether its personnel were charged with crimes.”).
112
See id. at 353 (“KPMG’s decision to cut off all payments of legal fees and expenses to anyone
who was indicted and to limit and to condition such payments prior to indictment upon cooperation
with the government was the direct consequence of the pressure applied by the Thompson
Memorandum and the USAO. Absent the Thompson Memorandum and the actions of the USAO,
KPMG would have paid the legal fees and expenses of all of its partners and employees both prior to
and after indictment, without regard to cost.”); see also id. at 345–46 (“Skadden’s Mr. Rauh wrote to
the USAO, enclosing among other things a form letter that Skadden was sending to counsel for the
KPMG Defendants then employed by KPMG who had received subject letters from the government or
otherwise appeared to be under suspicion. The form letter stated that KPMG would pay an individual's
legal fees and expenses, up to a maximum of $400,000, on the condition that the individual ‘cooperate
with the government and . . . be prompt, complete, and truthful.’ Importantly, however, it went even
further. It made clear that ‘payment of . . . legal fees and expenses will cease immediately if . . . [the
recipient] is charged by the government with criminal wrongdoing.’”).
113
See id. at 362 (“The Government’s Actions Violated the Substantive Due Process Right to
Fairness in the Criminal Process.”).
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her in order to prepare a defense, free of knowing or reckless government
interference.114 This statement can be broken down into three separate
elements. First, the Government cannot knowingly or recklessly interfere
with this right. Second, a defendant has the right to obtain and use
resources lawfully available to him or her to prepare a defense. Third, that
right is fundamental.
The Government is prevented from interfering with the manner in
which a defendant wishes to present a defense.115 The court noted that this
“general rule” is “based on a presumption that the criminal defendant,
‘after being fully informed, knows his own best interests and does not need
them dictated by the State.’”116 The court then went further, stating that
the “underlying theme” of all the case law it has reviewed on the subject is
“that the government may not both prosecute a defendant and then seek to
influence the manner in which he or she defends the case.”117 The court
noted that there are several aspects to a defendant’s right to control the
manner and substance of the defense.118 Two aspects of this right are
particularly noteworthy.
First, the court explained, “[a] defendant is guaranteed . . . ‘the right to
be represented by an otherwise qualified attorney whom that defendant can
afford to hire’—in other words, to use his or her own assets to defend the
case, free of government regulation.”119 Second, the court said, “[n]or may
the government interfere at will with a defendant's choice of counsel, as the
Constitution ‘protect[s] . . . the defendant’s free choice independent of
concern for the objective fairness of the proceedings.’”120 There is a subtle
difference between these two separate aspects of the same right. The first
principle says simply that a criminal defendant is entitled to hire whomever
he determines to be the best attorney he can afford. The second principle
says that the Government cannot interfere with a defendant’s choice of
counsel.
Finally, having concluded that there is a right, the court considered
whether the right is fundamental. The court began the analysis by noting
that the “right to fairness in criminal proceedings has not been explicitly []
114

Id. at 361–62.
See id. at 357 (“So proper respect for the individual prevents the government from interfering
with the manner in ‘which the individual wishes to present a defense.’”).
116
Id. at 357 n.126 (citing Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
117
Id. at 357.
118
Id.
119
Id. (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989)
(emphasis added)).
120
Id. at 357 n.130 (quoting United States v. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 818 (1st Cir. 1987)
(internal citation and quotation omitted)); see also Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 279 (6th Cir.
1985) (“[R]ecognition of the right [to counsel of choice] also reflects constitutional protection of the
accused's free choice.”).
115
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characterized [as fundamental] by the [United States Supreme] Court.”121
This problem is overcome by the necessity of fairness in the criminal
justice process. The court held that this right was fundamental because
“such a right is basic to our concepts of justice and fair play.”122 The court
cited many cases to support this conclusion. For example, the court quoted
from Glucksberg: “‘[N]either liberty nor justice would exist’ if fairness to
criminal defendants were sacrificed.”123 The court also noted that:
[T]he Supreme Court’s repeated recognition of the
constitutional mandate of fairness in criminal proceedings
strongly suggests that this right is “fundamental” for
substantive due process purposes, at least in some
circumstances. Indeed, it would be difficult to conclude
otherwise. Our concern with protection of the individual
against the unfair use of the great power of the government is
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”124
C. Second Premise: The Defendants in this Case Had Such Resources
Available to Them, and They Were Entitled to Those Resources
The district court found—as one of its four “Ultimate Factual
Conclusions”—that KPMG had a long-standing policy of paying the legal
fees and expenses of its personnel in all cases and investigations.125 This
was only part of the matter. It was more important that the defendants
show that they were entitled to have their legal fees paid for them by their
employer-company, KPMG. The district court began this opinion by
referencing “three principles of American Law,” the third of which is as
follows:126
The third principle is . . . simply this: an employer often
121

Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 360.
Id. at 362.
123
Id. at 361.
124
Id.
125
See id. at 352 (“First, the Thompson Memorandum caused KPMG to consider departing from
its long-standing policy of paying legal fees and expenses of its personnel in all cases and
investigations even before it first met with the USAO. As a direct result of the threat to the firm
inherent in the Thompson Memorandum, it sought an indication from the USAO that payment of fees
in accordance with its settled practice would not be held against it.”).
126
Id. at 355. The other two principles are as follows:
The first principle is that everyone accused of a crime is entitled to a
fundamentally fair trial. This is a central meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution. . . . The second principle, a corollary of the first, is that everyone
charged with a crime is entitled to the assistance of a lawyer. A defendant with the
financial means has the right to hire the best lawyers money can buy. A poor
defendant is guaranteed competent counsel at government expense. This is at the
heart of the Sixth Amendment.
Id.
122
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must reimburse an employee for legal expenses when the
employee is sued, or even charged with a crime, as a result of
doing his or her job. Indeed, the employer often must
advance legal expenses to an employee up front, although the
employee sometimes must pay the employer back if the
employee has been guilty of wrongdoing.
This third principle is . . . very much a part of American
life. Persons in jobs big and small, private and public, rely
on it every day. Bus drivers sued for accidents, cops sued for
allegedly wrongful arrests, nurses named in malpractice
cases, news reporters sued in libel cases, and corporate
chieftains embroiled in securities litigation generally have
similar rights to have their employers pay their legal
expenses if they are sued as a result of their doing their jobs.
This right is as much a part of the bargain between employer
and employee as salary or wages.127
The defendants in this case claimed that KPMG was obligated to
advance to them their legal fees since they were being charged with a
crime that arose out of their duty to do their jobs.128 To paraphrase and
combine the two aspects mentioned above,129 the court reasoned that a
defendant has the right to use his or her own assets to defend the case, free
of government regulation. As mentioned above, the defendants in Stein I
were not prevented from using their own money to defend their case;
indeed, the crux of the case was that their employer, KPMG, would not pay
for their legal fees, or at least not unconditionally. This seeming
disconnect is no small matter and the court did not overlook it. The court
considered this argument under its Sixth Amendment analysis, but it is
equally applicable here. The court wrote, “the government . . . argues that
the KPMG Defendants have no right, under the Sixth Amendment or
otherwise, to spend ‘other people’s money’ on expensive defense counsel.
The rhetoric is appealing, but the characterization of the issue—and
therefore the conclusion—are wrong.”130 The court then turned to tort laws
to show that the defendants’ did indeed have a property interest in the legal
fees:131

127

Id.
See id. at 336 (“KPMG long has paid for the legal defense of its personnel, regardless of the
cost and regardless of whether its personnel were charged with crimes. The defendants who formerly
worked for KPMG say that it is obligated to do so here. KPMG, however, has refused.”).
129
See supra text accompanying notes 119–24.
130
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 367.
131
See id. at 367 n.180 (“The torts of interference with prospective economic advantage and
inducement of breach of contract are well known. Interference with prospective economic advantage
128
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Here, the KPMG Defendants had at least an expectation that
their expenses in defending any claims or charges brought
against them by reason of their employment by KPMG would
be paid by the firm. The law protects such interests against
unjustified and improper interference. Thus, both the
expectation and any benefits that would have flowed from
that expectation—the legal fees at issue now—were, in every
material sense, their property, not that of a third party. The
government’s contention that the defendants seek to spend
“other people’s money” is thus incorrect.132
D. Third Premise: If the Government Did Not Interfere, Then KPMG
Would Have Paid for the Defendants’ Legal Fees Unconditionally and
Without Regard to Cost
1. The District Court’s Findings
The defendants went further than just claiming that they were entitled
to have their legal fees paid for by KPMG.133 They claimed that the only
reason that their fees were cut off was because of improper government
pressure.134 In other words, if the Government had not improperly
pressured KPMG then KPMG would not have, among other things, capped
the fees at $400,000 and conditioned the payment of these fees on
cooperation with the Government.135 Eventually, the court agreed with the
defendants, holding as one of its four “Ultimate Factual Conclusions” that:
KPMG’s decision to cut off all payments of legal fees and
expenses to anyone who was indicted and to limit and to
condition such payments prior to indictment upon
cooperation with the government was the direct consequence
of the pressure applied by the Thompson Memorandum and
the USAO. Absent the Thompson Memorandum and the
covers interference with the ability to pursue legal remedies against another party.” (internal citations
omitted)).
132
Id.
133
Indeed the Stein I court recognized this, “If that were all there were to the dispute, it would be
a private matter between KPMG and its former personnel.” Id. at 336.
134
See id. at 336 (“These defendants . . . claim that KPMG has refused to advance defense costs
to which the defendants are entitled because the government pressured KPMG to cut them off.”).
135
See id. at 345–46 (“Skadden’s Mr. Rauh wrote to the USAO, enclosing among other things a
form letter that Skadden was sending to counsel for the KPMG Defendants then employed by KPMG
who had received subject letters from the government or otherwise appeared to be under suspicion.
The form letter stated that KPMG would pay an individual’s legal fees and expenses, up to a maximum
of $400,000, on the condition that the individual ‘cooperate with the government and . . . be prompt,
complete, and truthful.’ Importantly, however, it went even further. It made clear that ‘payment of . . .
legal fees and expenses will cease immediately if . . . [the recipient] is charged by the government with
criminal wrongdoing.’”).
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actions of the USAO, KPMG would have paid the legal fees
and expenses of all of its partners and employees both prior
to and after indictment, without regard to cost.136
The court put it another way, earlier in the opinion, this time emphasizing
that it really was not a choice made by KPMG, as in there was no other
option available to KPMG: “KPMG refused to pay because the
government held the proverbial gun to its head.”137
The Government argued that—the Thompson Memorandum and the
actions of the USAO notwithstanding—the decision to cap and condition
the advancement of attorneys’ fees was made completely by KPMG. The
court noted that:
[T]he government points to the Statement of Facts attached to
the DPA as evidence that KPMG made the decision
concerning legal fees ‘on its own initiative’ and argues that
‘this decision [w]as one reached by the firm for its own
reasons, not at the request or direction of the Government.’138
In short, the Government argued that KPMG came up with the idea to cap
and condition the fees. The Government could have pointed to something
KPMG attorney Robert S. Bennett, of Skadden, said about this: “In
addition, it [KPMG] had done something ‘never heard of before’—
conditioned the payment of attorney’s fees on full cooperation with the
investigation. . . . He noted that what was really ‘precedent-setting’ about
the case was the conditioning of payment of legal fees on cooperation.”139
This strongly suggests that it was KPMG and not the Government that
came up with the idea to condition the payment of the attorney’s fees on
full cooperation with the Government. Indeed, it seems like KPMG was
taking credit for coming up with this strategy and looking to benefit from
doing so.
The court responded to this argument by saying that “the argument [is]
without merit. There is no inconsistency between KPMG making the
decision ‘for its own reasons’ and the decision having been a product of
government pressure. The Government pressure in fact was the reason that
KPMG made the decision.”140 In other words, the Government’s argument
fails to take into consideration the Thompson Memorandum and the
actions of the USAO. It was the influence of the Thompson Memorandum
and the actions of the USAO that pressured KPMG to decide to cap and
condition the legal fees.
136

Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
Id. at 336.
138
Id. at 353 n.97.
139
Id. at 349.
140
Id. at 353 n.97.
137
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2. Discussion on Causation
It is an interesting conclusion the court reaches when it finds that there
is no inconsistency between KPMG making the decision for its own
reasons and the decision having been a product of Government pressure.
The court says that it is perfectly consistent because the Government
pressure was the reason that KPMG made the decision. This is interesting
because it means that at least for the duration of time it took to make this
decision, the interests of KPMG and the Government were the same, and
that the Government acted first. In other words, the court says that the
Government made KPMG’s interests match the Government’s interests. In
doing what was best for KPMG, Skadden was also doing what the
Government wanted. Indeed, this was the purpose of the Thompson
Memorandum and the USAO’s actions—to get corporation like KPMG to
cooperate. The only problem with this, of course, is that it is violative of
the defendants’ constitutional rights.141
Another argument the Government made was that although the
Thompson Memorandum is strong in its language, in practice the
Government only considers the payment of legal fees as a negative factor
when those fees are used to impede.142 This argument was ultimately
unpersuasive. The problem was that the Government coerced KPMG to
cap and condition legal fees. The only piece of information that a defense
lawyer can act on to have an idea of how the Government is going to treat
the corporation he or she represents is the Thompson Memorandum, which
is binding on all prosecutors. Hence, what prosecutors do in practice is not
important because it cannot be easily known to the defense attorneys:
But whatever the government may do in the privacy of U.S.
Attorneys’ offices and in the DOJ’s Criminal Division is not
what defense lawyers see.
They see the Thompson
Memorandum. Few if any competent defense lawyers would
advise a corporate client at risk of indictment that it should
feel free to advance legal fees to individuals in the face of the
language of the Thompson Memorandum itself. It would be
irresponsible to take the chance that prosecutors might view
141
See id. at 356 (“The Government Violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by Causing KPMG
to Cut Off Payment of Legal Fees and Other Defense Costs Upon Indictment.”); see also Stein V, 541
F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008) (“We further hold that the government thus unjustifiably interfered with
defendants’ relationship with counsel and their ability to mount a defense, in violation of the Sixth
Amendment, and that the government did not cure the violation. Because no other remedy will return
defendants to the status quo ante, we affirm the dismissal of the indictment as to all thirteen
defendants.”).
142
See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 364 (“The USAO, possibly concerned with the breadth of the
Thompson Memorandum, seeks to deal with this by asserting that, in practice, it considers the payment
of legal fees as a negative factor only when payments are used to impede.”).
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it as “protecting . . . culpable employees and agents.” As
KPMG’s new chief legal officer, former U.S. District Judge
Sven Erik Holmes, testified, he thought it indispensable (as
would any defense lawyer) “to be able to say at the right time
with the right audience, we’re in full compliance with the
Thompson Memorandum.”143
E. Conclusion: Because the Resources to Prepare a Defense Were
Capped and Conditioned, the Defendants’ Rights Were Violated144
The conclusion that the defendants’ constitutional rights were violated
must follow if we accept the first three premises. The defendants were not
permitted by the Government to present the defense they wished to present
because the Government limited the funds that were lawfully available to
the defendants.145 Therefore, the Thompson Memorandum and the actions
of the USAO are subject to strict scrutiny review. “The Fourteenth
Amendment ‘forbids the government to infringe . . . ‘fundamental’ liberty
interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling [government] interest.”146 In
other words, there were two different requirements to survive strict
scrutiny—the action must be narrowly tailored and the action must serve a
compelling government interest.
The Stein I court listed three independent goals of the Thompson
Memorandum. First, it is intended to be used as a guide for prosecutors
who must decide whether to charge business entities.147 Second, it
encourages these business entities to pressure their employees to help and
cooperate with the Government.148 Third, it seeks to punish those whom
the USAO deem culpable; indeed it attempts to frame the paying of legal
fees as “protecting . . . culpable employees.”149 The Stein I court held that
the Thompson Memorandum and the actions of the USAO failed the strict
scrutiny test because of the second and third “goals” listed above.
The court noticed that the Thompson Memorandum did not say “that
payment of legal fees may cut in favor of indictment only if it is used as a
means to obstruct an investigation,” and therefore was not narrowly
tailored.150 The Thompson Memorandum simply stated that “while cases
143

Id. at 364.
See id. at 362 (“The Government’s Actions Violated the Substantive Due Process Right to
Fairness in the Criminal Process.”).
145
Id.
146
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (emphasis omitted).
147
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 363.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
See id. (“Nor does anyone suggest that an entity’s obstruction of a government investigation—
what the government has called ‘circling the wagons’ should be ignored in a charging decision.”).
144
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will differ depending on the circumstances, a corporation’s promise of
support to culpable employees and agents, either through the advancing of
attorneys fees . . . may be considered by the prosecutor in weighing the
extent and value of a corporation's cooperation.”151 The Stein I court took
issue with the fact that the Thompson Memorandum could deem certain
employees “culpable” long before there is any hearing on the matter. The
court wrote that “[t]he job of prosecutors is to make the Government’s best
case to a jury and to let the jury decide guilt or innocence.”152 The Stein I
court went further, saying that the Thompson Memorandum requires the
prosecutors to “abuse [their] power.”153 It is because of this that the
Thompson Memorandum was not narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling government objective.154
The court took issue with the premise inherent in the Thompson
Memorandum—that a company cannot at the same time cooperate fully
with the Government and pay for the legal fees of its employees.155 It is
clear that the court did not like the presumption made in the Thompson
Memorandum that irrespective of guilt, the payment of legal fees for their
employees automatically implies non-cooperation. The court provided the
following explanation:
[A] company may pay at the same time that it does its best to
bare its corporate soul, stands at the government’s beck and
call to provide information and witnesses, and does a myriad
of other things to aid the government and clean the corporate
house. So it simply cannot be said that payment of legal fees
for the benefit of employees and former employees
necessarily or even usually is indicative of an unwillingness
to cooperate fully.156
Although this did not come from the mind of Mr. Thompson—as this part
was also in the Holder Memorandum—he did defend the policy. He was
quoted as saying “that if employees really don’t believe they acted with
criminal intent, ‘they don’t need fancy legal representation’ to defend
themselves. There are lots of reasonably priced lawyers, he says.”157 The
151

See supra text accompanying notes 56–57.
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 363.
153
See id. (“Punishment is imposed by judges subject to statute. The imposition of economic
punishment by prosecutors, before anyone has been found guilty of anything, is not a legitimate
governmental interest—it is an abuse of power.”).
154
Id. at 364.
155
See id. (“There is no necessary inconsistency between an entity cooperating with the
government and, at the same time, paying defense costs of individual employees and former
employees.”).
156
Id.
157
See Laurie P. Cohen, Prosecutors’ Tough New Tactics Turn Firms Against Employees—As
Sentencing Rules Stiffen, KPMG Axes Tax Partners, Won’t Pay Their Legal Costs—What
152
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and refuted it. The court wrote that:

The innocent need able legal representation in criminal
matters perhaps even more than the guilty. In addition,
defense costs in investigations and prosecutions arising out of
complex business environments often are far greater than in
less complex criminal matters. Counsel with the skills,
business sophistication, and resources that are important to
able representation in such matters often are more expensive
than those in less complex criminal matters. Moreover, the
need to review and analyze frequently voluminous
documentary evidence increases the amount of attorney time
required for, and thus the cost of, a competent defense. Thus,
even the innocent need substantial resources to minimize the
chance of an unjust indictment and conviction.159
For all the reasons mentioned here and above, the court held that the legal
fee advancement provision violated the Due Process Clause because it was
not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling objective.160
F. Remedy
An indictment is only dismissed if there is no other remedy available.
Indeed, it “should not even be considered unless it is otherwise ‘impossible
to restore a criminal defendant to the position that he would have occupied’
but for the misconduct.”161 Remedies for constitutional violations are
narrowly tailored to the injury suffered.162 The Stein I court reviewed
many possible remedies; it dismissed some163 and left the possibility to
finding a remedy open and to be considered in the future. It left the
possibility of finding a monetary remedy open, stating the following:
Thus, there are at least two possibilities for resolving the
issue of advancement of defense costs. . . . Should that come
‘Cooperation’ Entails, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2004, at A1 (“But given that legal costs can run hundreds
of thousands of dollars, isn’t the government being unfair to company employees if it pressures their
employers not to pick up the tab? Mr. Thompson’s response is that if employees really don't believe
they acted with criminal intent, ‘they don’t need fancy legal representation’ to defend themselves.
There are lots of reasonably priced lawyers, he says.”).
158
Although it did not take it into account in its decision because it was not entered into evidence.
See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338, n.13 (“Naturally, the Court does not consider it in deciding this
matter, as it is not in evidence.”).
159
Id.
160
Id. at 364–65.
161
Id. at 374 (quoting United States v. Artuso, 618 F.2d 192, 196–97 (2d Cir. 1980)).
162
Id.
163
See id. at 376 (“This Court agrees. Accordingly, monetary sanctions do not overcome
sovereign immunity.”).
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to pass, the possibilities of dismissal of the indictment and
other remedies likely would appear in a different light. In
consequence, the Court declines to consider additional relief
at this time, although it may do so in the future if KPMG
does not, for one reason or another, advance defense costs.164
In Stein II, the court ruled it “had ancillary jurisdiction over
Defendants[] civil suit against KPMG for advancement of fees.”165 In
Stein III, the Second Circuit vacated the Stein II ruling, thus ridding the
district court of a possible remedy.166 In Stein IV, the court held that there
is no other remedy available and it dismissed the indictments.167 The Stein
IV court noted its reluctance to dismiss the indictments:
The Court has reached this conclusion only after pursuing
every alternative short of dismissal and only with the greatest
reluctance. This indictment charges serious crimes. They
should have been decided on the merits as to every
defendant. The Court well understands, moreover, that
prosecutors can and should be aggressive in the pursuit of the
public interest. It respects the distinguished record of the
United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of
New York, which long has been, and continues to be, a
model for the nation. But there are limits on the permissible
actions of even the best prosecutors.168
The Second Circuit’s review of this case is discussed in great detail below.
IV. THE SECOND CIRCUIT AND THE VIOLATION OF THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of thirteen
defendants’ indictments on Sixth Amendment grounds.169 It should be
noted that the circuit court reached this holding by affirming only a
relatively small piece of the district court’s decision. As mentioned above,
the district court found numerous Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations by
the Government. The circuit court only found it necessary to affirm one,
and it did not reach the district court’s other rulings. The specific action
that the circuit court affirms as violative of the defendants’ Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is “KPMG’s termination of fees upon

164

Id. at 380.
Stein V, 541 F.3d 130, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2008).
166
Id.
167
Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 423, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
168
Id. at 427.
169
Stein V, 541 F.3d 130 at 136.
165
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170

indictment.”
This means that the circuit court did not reach a decision
on whether the “pre-indictment conditioning and capping of fees—conduct
. . . determined [to be] state action—establishes a Sixth Amendment
violation by itself.”171 The circuit court did not consider the district court’s
Fifth Amendment ruling either.172
The Second Circuit reviewed each of Judge Kaplan’s four ultimate
factual conclusions, and could not find clear error.173 Most importantly,
the court determined that Judge Kaplan’s factual finding that absent the
Thompson Memorandum and the prosecutors’ conduct, KPMG would
have advanced fees without condition or cap survives scrutiny.174 Since
the court could not find clear error, it adopted these factual findings.175
The circuit court held to this finding even though it deemed the
Government’s argument “plausible.”176 The Government argued that
“even absent government pressure KPMG would not have advanced legal
fees indefinitely and without condition.”177 This was supported by the
“undisputed” fact that KPMG’s longstanding fees policy was voluntary
and subject to revision—in other words, it was not mandated by Delaware
statute or in the employees work contracts.178 The circuit court refused to
accept this argument because it directly contradicts Judge Kaplan’s
“central” finding that “absent the Thompson Memorandum and the actions
of the USAO, KPMG would have paid the legal fees and expenses of all of
its partners and employees both prior to and after indictment, without
regard to cost.”179
A. Government Action
The court found that the actions of KPMG were influenced by the
Government in such a controlling manner as to constitute “state action”:
170

Id. at 153–54 n.13.
Id.
172
See id. at 136 (“In light of this disposition, we do not reach the district court’s Fifth
Amendment ruling.”).
173
Id. at 142–45.
174
See id. at 143 (“Finally, we cannot say that the district court’s ultimate finding of fact—that
absent the Thompson Memorandum and the prosecutors’ conduct KPMG would have advanced fees
without condition or cap—was clearly erroneous.”).
175
See id. at 144 (“For the foregoing reasons, we cannot disturb Judge Kaplan’s factual findings,
including his finding that, but for the Thompson Memorandum and the prosecutors’ conduct, KPMG
would have advanced legal fees without condition or cap.”).
176
Id. at 146.
177
Id.
178
See id. (“True, even if KPMG had decided initially to advance legal fees, it might always have
changed course later: it is undisputed that KPMG’s longstanding fees policy was voluntary and subject
to revision. (In fact, in the civil suit KPMG represented that it would not have obligated itself to pay
millions of dollars in fees on behalf of an unknown number of employees without regard to the charges
ultimately lodged against them.)”).
179
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
171
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Actions of a private entity are attributable to the State if
there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the
challenged action of the . . . entity so that the action of the
latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. . . . Such
responsibility is normally found when the State has exercised
coercive power or has provided such significant
encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in
law be deemed to be that of the State.180
The court took into account the delicate nature of large corporations. It
noted how lethal an indictment could be to a corporation—regardless of
whether the corporation is ever convicted.181 This showed that KPMG had
good reason to believe that if it were indicted, it would collapse. In order
to stave off indictment, KPMG would have to cooperate fully with the
Government. Indeed, the reason KPMG retained Skadden was to
formulate a “cooperative approach” when dealing with the USAO.182
Since the Government’s Thompson Memorandum deemed the paying
of legal fees to count toward indictment, KPMG’s defense attorney had no
choice but to give in to government pressure on the matter. As the court
wrote, “Since defense counsel’s objective in a criminal investigation will
virtually always be to protect the client, KPMG’s risk was that fees for
defense counsel would be advanced to someone the Government
considered culpable. So the only safe course was to allow the Government
to become (in effect) paymaster.”183 But the Government did not just
control KPMG’s policy on advancing legal fees. The Government became
“entwined in the control of [the company] KPMG.”184 This was evidenced
by the supplemental letter they demanded be sent to the employees stating
that they do not need an attorney when interviewed by prosecutors.185
Also, prosecutors regularly reported to KPMG the names of employees
who it deemed uncooperative because “the USAO knew full well that
KPMG would pressure them to talk to prosecutors.”186 The court
180
Id. at 146–47 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Blum v. Yaretsky,
457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
181
See Stein V, 541 F.3d 130 at 142 (noting that “KPMG was faced with the fatal prospect of
indictment”); see also id. (“Moreover, KPMG’s management and counsel had reason to consider the
impact of the firm’s indictment on the interests of the firm’s partners, employees, clients, creditors and
retirees.”).
182
Id. at 137.
183
Id. at 148.
184
Id. (quoting Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 187 (2d Cir. 2005)).
185
See id. at 143 (“On March 12, the prosecutors prevailed upon KPMG to supplement its first
advisory letter with another, which clarified that employees could meet with the government without
counsel.”).
186
See id. at 148 (“They did so by regularly ‘reporting to KPMG the identities of employees who
refused to make statements in circumstances in which the USAO knew full well that KPMG would
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determined that this “overt encouragement” demonstrated sufficient
control over KPMG’s decisions to support the conclusion that KPMG’s
actions are properly attributed to the state.187 The Government took
advantage of its influence over the company and calibrated KPMG’s
desires to match the Government’s desires; in other words the Government
attempted to get KPMG to think like the Government. This was
demonstrated by the following facts, as explained by the circuit court:
KPMG was never “free to define” cooperation
independently: [the USAO] told Bennett that he had “had a
bad experience in the past with a company conditioning
payments on a person’s cooperation, where the company did
not define cooperation as ‘tell the truth’ the[ ] way we [the
prosecutors] define it.” KPMG's fees advancement decisions
in individual cases thus depended largely on state-influenced
standards.188
B. The Sixth Amendment Attaches at the Initiation of Adversarial
Proceedings
What should happen when the Government action occurs before the
initiation of adversarial proceedings—and thus before Sixth Amendment
protection—but the effect continues throughout the whole process? Is the
Sixth Amendment not implicated or is the Government unfairly gaming the
system? The Thompson Memorandum and the actions of the USAO had
the effect of limiting access to funds for the defense of the defendants long
before the first indictment.189 Even if this was not the intentional motive of
the Government it certainly knew it was an “exceptionally” likely result.190
The court reasoned that because the result will be “unconstitutional,” the
fact that the actions took place before any defendants were indicted does
not “save the government.”191 As the court wrote: “In other words, the
government’s pre-indictment conduct was of a kind that would have postindictment effects of Sixth Amendment significance, and did.”192
pressure them to talk to prosecutors.’” (quoting United States v. Stein (Stein II), 440 F. Supp. 2d 315,
337 (S.D.N.Y. 2006))).
187
See id. (“The prosecutors thus steered KPMG toward their preferred fee advancement policy
and then supervised its application in individual cases. Such ‘overt’ and ‘significant encouragement’
supports the conclusion that KPMG's conduct is properly attributed to the State.”).
188
Id. at 149.
189
Id. at 153.
190
See id. (“Even if this was not among the conscious motives, the Memorandum was adopted
and the USAO acted in circumstances in which that result was known to be exceptionally likely.”).
191
See id. (“The fact that events were set in motion prior to indictment with the object of having,
or with knowledge that they were likely to have, an unconstitutional effect upon indictment cannot save
the government.”).
192
Id.
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If the Government is “saved” and the Sixth Amendment protections do
not attach, the result would give federal prosecutors almost complete
control over the corporations.193 The Government would assume complete
control over the corporations for the same reasons that KPMG’s actions
were deemed to be state actions in this case: a corporate defense attorney
will do all in his or her power to avoid indictment.194 If the Government
knows that corporations will be willing to fully cooperate with them, the
prosecutors in effect also assume the roles of jury and sentencing-judge.
This gives the Government tremendous bargaining power when the two
parties attempt to reach a deferred prosecution agreement. It also would
open the door for the Government to interfere with the employeedefendants’ defense without recourse. This would simply give the
prosecution too much authority and too much power over the employees of
corporations.
The alternative is to allow Sixth Amendment rights to attach for state
action that occurs before the initiation of the adversarial process—before
indictment—when that state action effects defendants after the adversarial
process has begun.195 The circuit court explained that “[w]hen the
Government acts prior to indictment so as to impair the suspect’s
relationship with counsel post-indictment, the pre-indictment actions ripen
into cognizable Sixth Amendment deprivations upon indictment.”196 Thus,
the court did not change the rule that the Sixth Amendment “attaches only
upon indictment.”197 The court does, however, say that pre-indictment
governmental interference with the accused’s relationship with counsel
becomes “ripe” upon indictment. In other words, potentially coercive state
action cannot go unexamined simply because it occurred before an
indictment and especially because it helped to lead to that indictment.
For this case, the circuit court wrote the following:
Since the Government forced KPMG to adopt the
constricted Fees Policy—including the provision for
terminating fee advancement upon indictment—and then
compelled KPMG to enforce it, it was virtually certain that
KPMG would terminate defendants’ fees upon indictment.
We therefore reject the Government’s argument that its
actions (virtually all pre-indictment) are immune from

193

Absent intervening congressional legislation or changing of the DOJ policy, of course.
See supra Part III.D.2.
195
See Stein V, 541 F.3d 130, 153 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Although defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights
attached only upon indictment, the district court properly considered pre-indictment state action that
affected defendants post-indictment.”).
196
Id. at 153.
197
Id. at 148 n.9.
194
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198

scrutiny under the Sixth Amendment.

Thus, the court refused to let the Government control and manipulate
KPMG’s decisions without examining these actions under the Sixth
Amendment. Again, as mentioned above, the court only reached a
decision on KPMG’s decision to terminate fees upon indictment—that this
action is violative of the defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel.199
The circuit court reviewed the protection that is afforded an accused by
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The court determined that the
Government cannot prevent an accused from obtaining counsel and it
imposes on the state the affirmative obligation to respect the decision of
the accused.200 The court also noted that “the right to counsel in an
adversarial legal system would mean little if defense counsel could be
controlled by the Government or vetoed without good reason.”201 This led
the court to ultimately conclude that “[i]n a nutshell, the Sixth Amendment
protects against unjustified governmental interference with the right to
defend oneself using whatever assets one has or might reasonably and
lawfully obtain.”202 In other words, it does not matter that the funds were
“other people’s money” as the Government argued.203 Because the circuit
court adopted the district court’s finding—that, absent the Thompson
Memorandum and the actions of the USAO, KPMG would have paid the
legal fees and expenses of all of its partners and employees both prior to
and after indictment, without regard to cost—that simply interfering with
the subject-to-change legal fees policy of the corporation was enough for a
Sixth Amendment violation.
In conclusion, the district court found that the defendants were forced
to limit their defense—in the economic sense—and would not have had to
do so had the Government not interfered in violation of their constitutional
rights.204 The circuit court found the same.205 This interference “caused
198

Id. at 153.
Id. at 153 n.13.
200
Id. at 154 (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170–71 (1985)).
201
Id.
202
Id. at 156.
203
Id. at 141.
204
Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
205
See Stein V, 541 F.3d at 151–52 n.10. The court explained that, in Stein IV:
All of the [present] KPMG Defendants . . . say that KPMG’s refusal to pay their
post-indictment legal fees has caused them to restrict the activities of their counsel,
limited or precluded their attorneys’ review of the documents produced by the
government in discovery, prevented them from interviewing witnesses, caused them
to refrain from retaining expert witnesses, and/or left them without information
technology assistance necessary for dealing with the mountains of electronic
discovery. The government has not contested these assertions. The Court therefore
has no reason to doubt, and hence finds, that all of them have been forced to limit
their defenses in the respects claimed for economic reasons and that they would not
have been so constrained if KPMG paid their expenses subject only to the usual sort
199
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them to restrict the activities of their counsel, and thus to limit the scope of
their pre-trial investigation and preparation.”206 This is emphasized by the
“extremely complex” nature of the case and the expectation that a trial was
expected to last between six to eight months.207 Therefore, the court
concluded that the defendants’ rights were violated under the Sixth
Amendment. Finding no other remedy available, the court affirmed the
district court’s dismissal of the indictments.208
Although the court specifically said it did not reach the issue of
whether the capping and conditioning of fees violates the defendants’ Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, there was no reason to believe that the Court
would not find that it did violate the Sixth Amendment.209 First, the circuit
court already deemed this action as “state action.”210 Second, the court
held that KPMG’s termination of fees upon indictment deprived
defendants of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the
defendants were forced to limit their defense—something they would not
have had to do if the Government had not interfered.211 The decision to put
a cap on the legal fees and to condition the payment of the fees on
cooperation had the same effect on their defense as did terminating the fees
upon indictment. It was the same because they were deprived of funds that
would have been advanced to them, had the Government not interfered.212
There is no reason to believe that terminating the payment of fees upon
indictment is any more violative of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
than terminating the payment of fees upon not cooperating with the
Government. Indeed, once the act of conditioning the payment of legal
fees on cooperation with the state is deemed a state action—as it was
of administrative requirements typically imposed by corporate law departments on
outside counsel fees.
Id.
206

Id. at 157.
Id.
208
See id. (“In the district court, the government conceded that these defendants are also entitled
to dismissal of the indictment, assuming the correctness of Stein I. We agree.” (internal citations
omitted)).
209
Id. at 153 n.13.
210
See id. at 136 (“We hold that KPMG’s adoption and enforcement of a policy under which it
conditioned, capped and ultimately ceased advancing legal fees to defendants followed as a direct
consequence of the government’s overwhelming influence, and that KPMG's conduct therefore
amounted to state action.”).
211
See id. at 157 (“In the district court, the government conceded that these defendants are also
entitled to dismissal of the indictment, assuming the correctness of Stein I. We agree.” (internal
citations omitted)).
212
See id. at 146 (“[T]he district court’s central finding—which is not clearly erroneous—that
‘[a]bsent the Thompson Memorandum and the actions of the USAO, KPMG would have paid the legal
fees and expenses of all of its partners and employees both prior to and after indictment, without regard
to cost.’ Because we cannot disturb this finding, we cannot accept the government’s claim of cure on
this score.” (internal references omitted)).
207
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213

deemed so here by the circuit court —it is difficult to see how it could be
any more violative of the Sixth Amendment. This would mean that the
government is conditioning the payment of the defendants’ legal fees on
the defendants’ cooperation with the government. This is even more
shocking since it is the Government that defines “cooperation” by the
factors listed in the Thompson Memorandum.214
V. REVISIONS OF THE THOMPSON MEMORANDUM AND CURING THE STEIN
PROBLEMS
Because the Holder Memorandum and the Thompson Memorandum
are examined in detail in Part II of this Note, this discussion will only
consider the revisions since the Thompson Memorandum: the McNulty
Memorandum and the Filip revisions.
A. The McNulty Memorandum
There were two main problems with the Thompson Memorandum.
First, it encouraged prosecutors to seek waivers of the attorney-client and
work product privileges.215 Second, it held against the corporation the
advancement of legal fees to its employees.216 The McNulty Memorandum
sought to fix some of these problems. The McNulty Memorandum is
prefaced with a shorter memorandum explaining the revisions:
I have decided to adjust certain aspects of our policy in
ways that will further promote public confidence in the
Department, encourage corporate fraud prevention efforts,
and clarify our goals without sacrificing our ability to
prosecute these important cases effectively. The new
language expands upon the Department's long-standing
213

See supra note 210.
See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3, § VI.A (“In gauging the extent of the
corporation’s cooperation, the prosecutor may consider the corporation’s willingness to identify the
culprits within the corporation, including senior executives; to make witnesses available; to disclose the
complete results of its internal investigation; and to waive attorney-client and work product
protection.”).
215
See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3, § II.A.4 (“[T]he corporation’s timely and
voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents,
including, if necessary, the waiver of corporate attorney-client and work product protection.”); see also
id. § VI.A (“In determining whether to charge a corporation, that corporation’s timely and voluntary
disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate with the government’s investigation may be
relevant factors. In gauging the extent of the corporation’s cooperation, the prosecutor may consider
the corporation’s willingness . . . to waive attorney-client and work product protection.”).
216
See id. § VI.B (“Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether the corporation
appears to be protecting its culpable employees and agents. Thus, while cases will differ depending on
the circumstances, a corporation’s promise of support to culpable employees and agents, either through
the advancing of attorneys fees . . . may be considered by the prosecutor in weighing the extent and
value of a corporation’s cooperation.”).
214
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policies concerning how we evaluate the authenticity of a
corporation’s cooperation with a government investigation.217
Mr. McNulty also notes that he is aware of the criticisms of the Thompson
Memorandum by groups within the corporate legal community.218
For waivers of the attorney-client and work product privileges, the
McNulty Memorandum instructs prosecutors to seek a waiver only if a
legitimate need for it exists, and then in the least intrusive manner.219 The
McNulty Memorandum distinguishes between “Category I” and “Category
II” privileged information. Prosecutors are instructed to try to obtain
purely factual information relating to the underlying misconduct first; this
is Category I information. This information may or may not be privileged.
“Only if the purely factual information provides an incomplete basis to
conduct a thorough investigation should prosecutors then request that the
corporation provide attorney-client communications or non-factual
attorney work product.”220 This is Category II information. “This
information includes legal advice given to the corporation before, during,
and after the underlying misconduct occurred.”221 Under the McNulty
Memorandum, prosecutors must obtain written authorization from the
United States Attorney when seeking Category I information and they must
obtain written authorization from the Deputy Attorney General before
seeking waiver for Category II information.222 If a corporation refuses to
provide Category II information, prosecutors are not allowed to consider
this as a negative factor; however, if they do provide the information,
prosecutors are allowed to consider this as a positive factor.223
The McNulty Memorandum made a few changes to the policy on
advancing legal fees. It states, “[p]rosecutors generally should not take
into account whether a corporation is advancing attorneys’ fees to
employees or agents under investigation and indictment.”224 In a footnote,
the memorandum makes an exception of this general principle for
“extremely rare cases” when “the totality of the circumstances show that it
217

McNulty Memorandum, supra note 6.
See id. (“Many of those associated with the corporate legal community have expressed concern
that our practices may be discouraging full and candid communications between corporate employees
and legal counsel. To the extent this is happening, it was never the intention of the Department for our
corporate charging principles to cause such a result.”).
219
Id. § 7.B.2; see also Keneally & Harris, supra note 5, at 4.
220
McNulty Memorandum, supra note 6, § 7.B.2.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
See id. (“If a corporation declines to provide a waiver for Category II information after a
written request from the United States Attorney, prosecutors must not consider this declination against
the corporation in making a charging decision. Prosecutors may always favorably consider a
corporation’s acquiescence to the government’s waiver request in determining whether a corporation
has cooperated in the government’s investigation.”); see also Keneally & Harris, supra note 5, at 4.
224
McNulty Memorandum, supra note 6, § 7.B.3.
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225

was intended to impede a criminal investigation.”
The memorandum
goes on to define what it considers impeding conduct. Such conduct
includes the following:
[O]verly broad assertions of corporate representation of
employees or former employees; . . . inappropriate directions
to employees or their counsel, such as directions not to
cooperate openly and fully with the investigation including,
for example, the direction to decline to be interviewed;
making presentations or submissions that contain . . .
omissions; and failure to promptly disclose illegal conduct
known to the corporation.226
The memorandum specifically notes that this “conduct intended to
impede” does not need to reach the level of criminal obstruction.227 Thus,
while it appears to be fixing the Stein problem, it carves out a relatively
large exception.
The McNulty Memorandum failed to redress some other problems of
the Thompson Memorandum. This memorandum continued to allow
prosecutors to independently deem specific employees culpable for
criminal wrongdoing and then hold this against the corporation if
The
prosecutors believe the corporation is protecting them.228
memorandum also allows prosecutors to consider negatively whether the
corporation has entered into a joint-defense agreement.229 Because the
memorandum left some of these problems unaddressed, or because they
were not cured as well as they could have been Congress decided to
intervene. The House of Representatives has already passed H.R. 3013,
the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007.230 If passed in the
Senate, prosecutors would be prevented from requesting waivers of the
attorney-client and work-product privilege, and it would prevent
prosecutors from considering the assertion of these privileges as well as the
advancement of attorneys’ fees and the retention of employees by an
organization.231

225

Id. § 7.B.3, n.3.
Id. § 7.B.4.
227
See id. § 7.B.4 (“Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether the corporation,
while purporting to cooperate, has engaged in conduct intended to impede the investigation (whether or
not rising to the level of criminal obstruction).”).
228
See id. § 7.B.3 (“Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether the corporation
appears to be protecting its culpable employees and agents.”).
229
Id.
230
Keneally & Harris, supra note 5, at 5.
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See id.
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B. The Filip Revisions
On August 28, 2008, the same day the Second Circuit affirmed the
Stein I decision, Mark R. Filip announced the revisions to the DOJ’s
corporate charging guidelines.232 Before announcing the specific revisions,
Mr. Filip described the reasons he decided to revise the policy. In doing
so, he highlighted the criticisms of past policies:
[M]any in the legal community have argued that prosecutors
have unfairly demanded that corporations produce privileged
materials or waive attorney-client or work-product
protections as a precondition for receiving cooperation credit.
Others have expressed concern that the Department could
unfairly withhold such credit from a corporation that
advanced attorneys’ fees to its employees, or failed to
sanction culpable employees, or entered into joint defense
agreements.233
Mr. Filip demonstrated a desire to assuage concerns of prosecutorial abuse
by engaging in “extended discussions” with a diverse array of groups.234
These groups include “for example, the criminal defense bar, the civil
liberties community, and the business community” as well as former DOJ
officials.235 Mr. Filip lists as critical mandates that guide the revisions
three principles: to enforce the law aggressively, to respect the rights of
criminal defendants and others involved in the criminal justice process, and
to promote fair outcomes for the American people.236 These revised
principles were set forth for the first time not in the form of a
memorandum, but in the United States Attorneys’ Manual.237 They were
made binding on all federal prosecutors and made effective immediately.238
The Filip revisions made four broad changes to the past policies. First,
the revisions shift the emphasis from waiving attorney-client and workproduct privileges to simply disclosing relevant facts in a timely manner.
Mr. Filip announced, “[c]orporations that timely disclose relevant facts
may receive due credit for cooperation, regardless of whether they waive
232
Filip’s August 28 Press Conference, supra note 7; see also Jonathan D. Glater & Michael M.
Grynbaum, U.S. Lifts a Policy in Corporate Crime Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2008, at C6 (“‘Two
branches of government in one day have announced their agreement that the government cannot
pressure businesses and other entities to treat individuals in a way that it would be unconstitutional for
the government to do directly,’ Stephanie Martz, director of the white-collar crime project for the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, wrote in an e-mail message.”).
233
Filip’s August 28 Press Conference, supra note 7.
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.; see also U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 8.
238
Filip’s August 28 Press Conference, supra note 7.
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attorney-client privilege or work product protection in the process.”
He
attempted to restate this in other ways to be more clear, saying, “[t]he
government will assess neither a credit nor a penalty based on whether the
disclosed materials are protected by the attorney-client privilege or
attorney work product.”240 The revisions forbid prosecutors from seeking
what the McNulty Memorandum called Category II information.241 This
prohibition has only two exceptions, but as Mr. Filip notes, both of which
are well-recognized in existing law.242
Second, prosecutors are “not to consider whether a corporation has
advanced attorneys’ fees to its employees, officers, or directors when
evaluating cooperativeness.”243 There is an exception to this, but unlike
the McNulty Memorandum, it is only for conduct that rises to the level of
criminal obstruction of justice.244 Mr. Filip notes that this will generally
not be the case.245 Specifically, the new policy says the following on the
subject:
In evaluating cooperation, however, prosecutors should
not take into account whether a corporation is advancing or
reimbursing attorneys’ fees or providing counsel to
employees, officers, or directors under investigation or
indictment. Likewise, prosecutors may not request that a
corporation refrain from taking such action. This prohibition
is not meant to prevent a prosecutor from asking questions
about an attorney’s representation of a corporation or its
employees, officers, or directors, where otherwise
appropriate under the law. Neither is it intended to limit the
otherwise applicable reach of criminal obstruction of justice
statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 1503. If the payment of attorney
fees were used in a manner that would otherwise constitute
criminal obstruction of justice—for example, if fees were
advanced on the condition that an employee adhere to a
version of the facts that the corporation and the employee
knew to be false—these Principles would not (and could not)
render inapplicable such criminal prohibitions.246
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Id.
Id.
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id.
244
See id. (“A corporation’s payment of or advancement of attorneys’ fees to its employees will
be relevant only in the rare situation where it, combined with other circumstances, would rise to the
level of criminal obstruction of justice.”).
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Id.
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U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 8, at ch. 9-28.730 (emphasis added).
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Third, “federal prosecutors may not consider whether the corporation
has entered into a joint defense agreement in evaluating whether to give the
corporation credit for cooperating.”247 Fourth, under the new revisions
prosecutors are not allowed to consider whether a corporation disciplined
or terminated employees for the purpose of evaluating cooperation.248
However, prosecutors may consider whether a corporation has “disciplined
employees that the corporation identifies as culpable, and only for the
purpose of evaluating the corporation’s remedial measures or compliance
program.”249 Filip reminds corporations toward the end of his statements
that a corporation’s refusal to cooperate is not evidence of guilt just as it
would not be evidence of guilt for an individual.250 Mr. Filip made it clear
that all of the revisions, “indeed the policy as a whole, reflect [the DOJ’s]
commitment to treating corporations that are under investigation no better
and no worse than individuals who are under investigation.”251
C. Curing the “Stein Problems”
It is important not to forget that Stein I had two problems. The
Thompson Memorandum was only one. The second problem was how the
Government dealt with the zealous corporation that was exceedingly
willing to cooperate. The Thompson Memorandum alone was not the
whole problem. Where the revisions to the DOJ policy have been made,
they have only addressed part of the Stein problem. The underlying facts
will still be the same in the future. A corporation will still believe that an
indictment would bring ruin.252 This means that a corporation under
suspicion will still be extremely willing to cooperate with prosecutors.
Therefore, the USAO will still be exposed to the risk of controlling the
decisions of the corporation. Judge Kaplan suggested that prosecutors
should shift their goal from only being concerned with punishing the
individuals who it deemed culpable to making sure that the corporation
does not cross the line when it is trying to cooperate. He wrote:
The contretemps with KPMG over its Advisory
Memorandum demonstrated the government’s desire,
wherever possible, to interview KPMG witnesses without
their being represented by lawyers. The USAO’s ready
acceptance of KPMG’s offer to cut off payment of legal fees
for anyone who was indicted speaks for itself. It speaks even
247

Filip’s August 28 Press Conference, supra note 7.
Id.
249
Id. (emphasis added).
250
Id.
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Mark R. Filip, Deputy Attorney Gen., Remarks as Delivered by Deputy Attorney General
Mark R. Filip at American Bar Association Securities Fraud Conference (Oct. 2, 2008).
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See, e.g., supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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more eloquently when one considers that the USAO accepted
KPMG’s assurance that it had no legal obligation to pay legal
fees, knowing that (1) KPMG’s “common practice” had been
to make such payments, (2) KPMG was extremely anxious to
curry favor with the USAO by demonstrating how
cooperative it could be, and (3) KPMG had an obvious
conflict of interest with its present and former personnel on
the question whether it had a legal obligation to pay fees.
Had the government been less concerned with punishing
those it deemed culpable right from the outset, it would not
have accepted KPMG’s word on this point.253
This suggests that the USAO has dual roles. It is supposed to
prosecute the case but at the same time it is also supposed to play the role
of a watchful guardian or paternal figure. Under the paternal role, the
USAO should make sure the corporation is not undertaking policies that
strip their employees of constitutional rights. Moreover, they should
discourage corporations from activities that would make the criminal
justice process unfair to their employees. This is a proactive responsibility.
Judge Kaplan seems to suggest that simply being passive and compliant
while the corporation makes decisions is not enough. The suggestion is
that the Government must oversee the process while making sure that the
corporation does not go too far.
Here, Judge Kaplan says that the Government would not have accepted
KPMG’s word that they had no duty to pay the employees’ legal fees if it
had not been so concerned with punishing those it deemed culpable. Judge
Kaplan expected the Government to at least inquire more into KPMG’s
obligation (or lack thereof) to pay the legal fees. This act would seem to
go against the prosecutor’s obvious desire to get a conviction. However, as
noted above, the duty of the prosecutor is not to get a conviction, but to
help administer justice.254 There may always be opportunity for the
Government to abuse its position and power—that may be unavoidable.
However, if all prosecutors enter these situations acknowledging their dual
roles and the responsibilities that accompany them, the occurrence of abuse
will decline.
VI. CONCLUSION
On the issue of advancement of attorneys’ fees, the Thompson
Memorandum could have been relatively easily revised to comply with
Judge Kaplan’s Stein I holding. Judge Kaplan even offered a proposal. He
wrote that:
253
254

Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
See supra text accompanying note 36.
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[T]he Thompson Memorandum does not say that payment of
legal fees may cut in favor of indictment only if it is used as a
means to obstruct an investigation. Indeed, the text strongly
suggests that advancement of defenses costs weighs against
an organization independent of whether there is any “circling
of the wagons.”255
Judge Kaplan suggested that this would be enough to make the
Government interference narrowly tailored. He wrote that:
If the government means to take the payment of legal fees
into account in making charging decisions only where the
payments are part of an obstruction scheme—and thereby
narrowly tailor its means to its ends—it would be easy
enough to say so. But that is not what the Thompson
Memorandum says.256
The DOJ attempted to comply with this suggestion, but it took
advantage of Judge Kaplan’s seemingly ambiguous uses of the word
“obstruction.” As mentioned above, the McNulty Memorandum instructed
prosecutors not to factor into their decision whether corporations advance
attorneys’ fees unless “the totality of the circumstances show that it was
The McNulty
intended to impede a criminal investigation.”257
Memorandum uses the word “impede,”258 and not the word “obstruct.”259
The Memorandum specifically notes that this “conduct intended to
impede” does not need to reach the level of criminal obstruction.260 This
leaves the potential for a court to find that the policy is not “narrowly
tailored” enough to pass the strict scrutiny test.
Mr. Filip recognized this as a potential problem. The Filip revisions
closed this gap by only allowing prosecutors to take into consideration the
advancement of attorneys’ fees for conduct that rises to the level of
criminal obstruction of justice.261 The Filip revisions strip from the
255

Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 363 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 364.
257
McNulty Memorandum, supra note 6 § 7.B.3 n.3 (emphasis added).
258
See id. (“In extremely rare cases, the advancement of attorneys’ fees may be taken into account
when the totality of the circumstances show that it was intended to impede a criminal investigation.”).
259
In § 7.B.4 of the McNulty Memorandum, the word “obstructing” is used, but immediately
distinguished from “criminal obstruction.” Id. §§ 7.B., 7.B.4.
260
See id. (“Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether the corporation, while
purporting to cooperate, has engaged in conduct intended to impede the investigation (whether or not
rising to the level of criminal obstruction).”).
261
See Filip’s August 28 Press Conference, supra note 7 (“A corporation’s payment of or
advancement of attorneys’ fees to its employees will be relevant only in the rare situation where it,
combined with other circumstances, would rise to the level of criminal obstruction of justice.”); see
also U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 8, at ch. 9-28.730 (“This prohibition is not meant to prevent a
prosecutor from asking questions about an attorney’s representation of a corporation or its employees,
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assessment any individual discretion of a prosecutor to decide whether
there exists impeding conduct. This means that Judge Kaplan would most
likely approve of this new policy because it has “narrowly tailor[ed] its
means to its ends.”262 It now appears that the DOJ’s policy on the
advancement of legal fees has been rectified.
However, the Filip revisions may not have resolved all of the problems
in the Thompson Memorandum. Mr. Filip made many changes to the
policy on seeking waiver of the attorney-client and work-product
privileges. The attempt resulted in a compromise. The revisions keep the
credit-for-cooperation system, but forbid prosecutors from seeking
information formally called “Category II” information. Again, Category II
information is attorney-client communications or any non-factual attorney
work product.263
The Filip revisions may not have fixed the problem of waiver. As
former Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty pointed out:
While the primary, commendable aim of the revisions is
to eliminate the perceived pressure to waive privilege in
exchange for cooperation credit, the practical impact of these
revisions remains to be seen. Because the extent to which a
corporation discloses relevant facts remains the touchstone of
the credit-for-cooperation analysis, there may be significant
pressure, implicit or explicit, to continue to waive if such
facts are protected by privilege.264
In other words, a corporation being investigated will still want to do
everything within its power to avoid the indictment. This means that it will
still seek to get as much credit as possible, thus, it will still want to hand
over the “Category II” information. The only difference is that the
prosecutor is not going to be the one initiating the transfer of this
information. The idea being that courts will likely find it very difficult to
establish “state action” when it appears that the corporation is volunteering
this information. In reality, very little has changed. Mr. McNulty suggests
that the “significant pressure” to waive still exists, and may always exist in
a credit-for-cooperation system.
The problem is rooted in the fact that indictments are fatal to major
corporations.265 This means that from the beginning of the process, a
corporation is compelled to follow the prosecution’s instructions on how to
officers, or directors, where otherwise appropriate under the law. . . . Neither is it intended to limit the
otherwise applicable reach of criminal obstruction of justice statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 1503.”).
262
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
263
McNulty Memorandum, supra note 6, § 7.B.2.
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23 ANDREWS LITIG. REP. 8, 9 (2008).
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avoid indictment. Under the Filip revisions, like it was under the
Thompson Memorandum, the way to avoid indictment is by cooperating
with the Government. Now, the Government will not view negatively a
corporation’s refusal to give privileged information. It will, however, still
give credit for that privileged information. Thus, a corporation is still
compelled under the Filip revisions to disclose attorney-client and workproduct privileged information. Under the Filip revisions the compelling is
done differently, almost passively—allowing the implied threat of
indictment to do the work.
The DOJ has made significant changes to its policy on prosecuting
business organizations. It now seems unlikely that a case like Stein I
where the Government interferes with the advancement of attorneys’ fees
will occur under the Filip revisions. However, there are other problems
within the policy that may not have been cured by the Filip revisions. One
problem that remains is the potential for prosecutorial abuse. Judge
Kaplan found the actions of the prosecution to have violated the
Constitution.266 This potential for abuse is inherent in the delicate nature
of prosecuting corporations. A second problem is that the revisions may
not have sufficiently resolved the waiver dispute. The future of the DOJ’s
policy remains to be seen. It is therefore appropriate to conclude with
something a unanimous Supreme Court wrote long ago and that Judge
Kaplan noted in Stein I: that the interest of the Government “in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”267

266
See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336 (“The government, however, has let its zeal get in the way
of its judgment. It has violated the Constitution it is sworn to defend.”).
267
Id. at 381 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).

